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Inthissurvey of recent research in health economics, I concentrate on
studies that have appeared since 1971 or are in progress. The survey reflects
inpartmy own research interests and biases and is not meant to be cotnr,rehen—
give.Four topics are covered:(1) demandfor adults' health and medical
care; (2) effects of health on labor supply and wage rates; (3) demand for
children'shealth and medical care;and (4) selected topics pertaining to the
supply side of the medical care market.
I.Demand for Adults' Health andMedicalCare
Most recent studies of the demand for adults' health andmedical care
haveadopted the model that I constructed to study this subject (12, 13]. A
fundamentalpropositionof thismodel is that whatconsurters demand when they
purchasemedical services are not theseservices perse but rather good health.
Basedon this proposition, one should derive the demand curve for medical care
fr the interaction between the production function of health and thedemand
curve forhealth. Within the context of Becker's household production func-
tion framework(3],I treat health as a durable item. Thus, indivjduals in-
herit an initialstockof health capital that depreciates with age andcan be
increasedby investment. By definition, net investment in the stock of health
equals gross investment minusdepreciation.Direct inputs into the production
ofgross investments in health include the n time of the consumer, medical
care, proper diet, exercise, recreation, housing, quality of the environment,
and other factors as well.
In the model, consumersdemand healthfor t reasons. As a consumption
dity, it directly enters their utility functions, or put differently,—2—
illness is a source of disutility. As an investment coumodity, it determines
the total amountoftime available for workinthe market sector of the econ-0
omy,where consers produce money earnings, and for work in the normiarket or
household sector, where they produce coodities that enter their utility
functions. The investment motive for demanding health is present because an
increase in the stock of health lowers the amount of time lost from market
and nonmarket activities due to illness and injury. I develop in detail two
extreme versions of this general demand for health model: a pure investment
version and apure consumption version. In the former, health does not enter
theutility function directly, while in the latter, the monetary rate of
return on an investment in health equals zero.
One of the main advantages of the model is that it makes strong pre-
dictions about the effects of shifts in variables other than income and the
price of medical care on the. quantities of health and medical care demanded.
These predictions are based on the proposition that the shadow price of
healthdepends on manyvariablesbesides thepriceof medical care. In
particular,the shadow price rises with age ifthe rate of depreciation on
thestock of health rises over the life cycle, and it falls with years of
formal schooling completed if more schooling makes a person a more efficient
producer of health. In general, an increase in the shadow priceof health
vouldlower the quantity of health demanded. If, however, the price elas-
ticity of demand for health were less than one, then the quantity of medical
care demanded would rise. Thus, in using this framework to study the demand
for medical care, an economist does not have to ignore variables, such as
attitudes, perceptions, demographic characteristics, and schooling, that non—
economists might consider to be important. Rather, onecanmake predictions
about the effects of these variables in an economic context.—3—
Inmy initial empirical application of this approach [13], using data
for individuals who had finishedtheirformal schooling, I estimated gross
investment production functions and diand curves for health and medical
care.The data source was a 1963 health interview survey conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center and the Center for Health Administration
Studies of the University of Chicago. I measured health capital by individ-
uals' self-evaluation of their health status as excellent, good, fair,or
poor; and I measured the healthy time output of health capital either by the
complement of the number of restricted—activity days due to illness and in—
jury or by the complement of the number of work—loss days. To check the
results obtained with these indexes of health, I also examined variationsin
deathrates across states of the Un.ited States. In my empirical work, I
focused on the effects of age, schooling, the value of time (measuredby the
wage rate), and property income on the quantities of health and medical care
demanded. Although not all its theoretical predictions were fulfilled,
enough were to suggest that the model provides a viable framework for under-
standing variations in health levels and medical care utilization.
During the past few years, several other persons and I have extended the
above framework both theoretically and empirically. One class ofextensions
deal with the properties of the demand function for medical care.Using my
basic approach, Phelps (26] has developed a model of the joint determination
of the demand for medical care and the demand for health insuranceunder tin—
certainty(random illness). He shows that the introduction ofuncertainty
does not alter the basic properties of the demand curve for medicalcare that
I derive from my model. Newhouse and Phelps [22, 23]employ my pure invest—
ment framework as the point of departure for estimating demandcurves for
various types of medical care. In their model, the ncminalprice of care—a —
andthe coinsurance rate associated with aconswer'shealth insurance policy,
aswell as the quantity ofcare, are endogenousvariables. Acton (1, 2] 0
stressesthat twoof the most importanttimeinputsinthe health production
processare travel time to the usual sources of medical care and waitingtime
inphysicians' offices or in clinics. Mefindsthat the quantity of medical
care demanded is negatively related to the amount of travel or waiting time
requiredtoobtain a unit of care in several low income samples of New York
City residents.
Currently, Newhouse, Phelps, Acton, andtheircolleagues at the Rand
Corporation are employing the above framework to estimate demand curves in
theirHealth Insurance Study (211. In this study, which is similar inde-
sign to the Income Maintenance Experiments, various forms of national health
insurance arebeingoffered to a sample of aproxixnate1y 5,000familiesin
sixcities. The a.ims of the study are to measure the impact of national
health insuranceon utilization of medical care, toobtainprecise estimates
of demandparametersin addition to the price elasticity, andtomeasure the
effect of increased utilization on health outcomes.
A second class of extensions is concerned with the role of the spouse's
characteristicsin the production of a person's health. Typically, married
aen devotemost of their time to market production, while their wives devote
aostof their time to nonmarket production. Based on this division of labor
withinthefamily,Joyce(16], Fuchs (7], Grossman arid Benham (14], and
Grossman(11] suggest that wives' timeshould bean important input in the
productionofhusbands'health.In the lastreference,I argue that, if an
increase in wives' schooling raises theirnonmarket productivity, thenit
wouldraise thequantityof husbands' health demanded. (This argnment
aBses either that the value of time is held constant or that the percent—0
ageincreasein nozarket productivity due to schooling exceeds the—5-
percentage increase in the value of time.)npirically,I find that wives'
schoolinghas approximatelythe same effect on husbands' health as husbands'
schooling in a high income sample [11]. Currently, Colic [53 is investi-
gating the role of wives' schooling in the demandcurves forhusbands' and
wives' health and medical care.
A third class of extensions is concerned with a detailedinvestigation
ofthe relationship between yearsof formal schooling completed andadults'
health. In myinitialwork [12, 13],, I modeled and tested thenotionthat
anincreasein schooling should cause health to rise.Specifically, the
efficiency with which individuals transform medical care and otherinputs
into better health should rise with schooling. This wouldtend to create a
positivecorrelation between schoolinq and the quantity of health demanded.
Within the context of the household production functionapproach to consumer
behavior,thereare,however, compellingreasons for treating theamount of
schooling persons acauire andtheirhealth at early stagesin their life
cycle, aswell as their health as adults, asendogenous variables.For
instance,itis reasonableto assume that healthier students are re effi-
cientproducers of additions to the stock of knowledge or humancapital via
formal schooling. If so, then they wouldtendto increase the quantity of
investment in knowledge they demand and the number ofyears they attend
school. Given afulllife cycle nde1 of decisionmaking, even whenan
dult's age, income, value of time, and spouse'scharacteristics areheld
constant,an observed positive correlation between own schooling andhealth
wouldnot necessarily imply a causal relationship thatruns from schooling
to health.
InGrossman[11) Idevelop a methodologicalframework thatcanbe used
to introduce and discuss alternative explanaioofthe observedpositive—6-
correlation between schooling and adults' health. In the theoretical section
of this study, I formulate a recursive system whose principal equations are
demand curves for children's health, schooling, and adults' health. I then
show how this system generates causal relationships from schooling to health
and from health to schooling. In addition, this system generates relation-
ships from third variables, such as genetic endowment, physical and mental
ability, aridparents' characteristics, to both health arid schooling. Existing
estimates of the effect of schooling on health are based on data sets that con-
tain information on current health of persons who have completed their formal
schooling. These data sets do not, however, have measures of health at early
stages in the life cycle and have only limited information on potential third
variables. My theoretical analysis stresses that current and past health
should be positively correlated and that healthier students should have an in-
centive toattend school for longer periods of time. Therefore, the coeffi-
cient of schooling in a regression with current health as the dependent vari-
able would be biased upward if past health werenotincluded in the regression.
Similarly,the schooling coefficient wouldbe biased if relevant third vari-
ableswere omitted from the health function.
pirically,I use the NBER-Thorndike sample to obtainan unbiasedesti-
sateof the effect of schooling on current subjective health status.My pro-
cedure is to include past subjective health status and third variablesin a
wiltipleregression analysis of current health, with these variables held
constant, schoolinghasa positive and significant effect on current health.
Using a similar methodology Manhejm (18] examines the effect of schooling on
the probability ofsurvival in a longitudinal sample of males in California.
Hefinds a positive effect of schooling on survival, with past health and
background variables held constant.—7-
Afinal class of extensions applies the quality—quantity scdel devel-
opedby Becker andLewis [41tothe market for physicians' services. Gold-
man andGrossman(lOJ argue that differences in quality are a distinguishing
characteristicof this market. The study hastwo purposes.The first is to
developa methodology forthe estimation of hedonicfee functions and de-
mand functions for the quantity and quality of physicians' services. The
second is to apply the methodology to analyze the demand for pediatric care
(care renderedto children byall physicians) in a sample of New York City
residents.In this sample detailed information on physicians' characteris-
tics, such as experience, specialty, board certification status, and member-
ship in professionalsocieties,is combined with data on fees, familychar-
acteristics of patients, andnumber of visits. By examining the relationship
betweenfees andphysicians'characteristics, one can estimate the quality
of care received by each child in the sample and the quality-adjusted price
paidbyhis or her parents..
In ourtheoreticalmodel, we stress the effects of income, the value
oftime, andthe quality-adjustedprice of pediatric services on the quan-
tity (visits)and quality of services demanded. Since consumers have the
option to trade quality for visits, these effects are somewhat different
than those discussed in other studies of the demand for medical care with
..icrodata sets. It is shown that the price of quality relative to the
price of visits (the relative price of quality) is directly related to the
quality—adjusted price of a visit and inversely related to the Ufixedu
costs of a visit. Fixed costs are costs that are independent of quality
and are defined as the sum of (1)transportationcost per visit and (2)
traveltimeto the physician's office and waiting time in the office evalu-
ated at the opportunity cost of the mother's time.—8—
Since the relative price of qualityis a positive function of quality—Q
adjustedprice, consumers should substitute away from qualityand toward
visits as quality—adjusted price rises. Although visits need not rise abso—
lutely, the ratio of visits to quality should be positively related to
quality-adjustedprice. Since therelativeprice of quality is a negative
function of fixed costs of a visit, anincreaseinthesecosts would cause
consumers to substitute quality for visits. In suxrrnary, fixed costs and
quality—adjusted price should have opposite signs in the demand curve for
quality. In addition, visits should be moresensitive to variations in
fixedcosts than to variations in quality—adjusted price.
The empirical work in the paper is based on a special sample of New
York City residents conducted by the New York City Department of Healthin
1965—66(the Mindlin-Densen survey). Estimates of quality and quality—
adjusted price of pediatric care are obtained from an ordinary least squares0
regressionanalysis of the usual fee of pediatric services rendered bypri-
aary care physicians in private practiceintheir of fices. These fees were
reportedby mothersof children inthe sample,who also were asked to iden-
tify by nameall primary care physicians in private practice who examined
their children during the survey period. Characteristics of these physi—
ciazis were obtained from the American Medical Association or New York State
Medical Directories.
Differences in characteristics among physicians are assumed to reflect
differences inqualityor productivity. Therefore, by regressing usual fee
on these characteristics, weobtainan estimate of quality from the predicted
value of usual fee for a given observation and an estimate of quality-adjusted
price from the regression residual. These estimates serve as inputs into the
Ccutation of demand functions for visits and quality.—9-
The demand functions are fitted by two—stage least squares with quality-
adjusted price treated as an endogenous variable. This procedure is followed
fortwo reasons. First, we argue that variation in quality—adjusted price
in a cross sect.ton canbetracedinparttoimperfect information dueto costs
ofsearch. Since equilibriumsearchtime should increase and equilibrium
quality—adjusted price should decrease as the quantity of pediatricservices
demanded increases, it would be inappropriate to estimate demand functions
by ordinary least squares. Second, our preliminary estimate of quality—
adjusted price is likely to contain errors of measurement. By introducing a
set of instrumental variables(equivalent to estimation by two—stage least
squares), we reduce these errors. In addition to the exogenous variables in
the demandfunctions,the instrumental variables include proxies for search
andinformation.
The major empirical results are as follows:
(1)Variations in usual fee associated with physicians' characteristics
areconsistentwith the hypothesis that these characteristics reflect differ-
ences in quality. In particular, non—board certified pediatricians charge
higher fees than general practitioners, andboardcertified pediatricians
chargehigher fees than non—board certified pediatricians. Fees are also
sensitiveto the number of years in which physicians have been in private
practice, to the number of memberships in recognized special societies, and
tothe place of medical education.
(2) Quality-adjusted price has a negative and statistically significant
regressioncoefficient in thedemand curveforquality. The same variable
hasan insignificant negative regression coefficient in the demand curve for
visits. At the point of means, the absolute value of the elasticity of
quality with respect to quality—adjusted price (.08) exceeds the absolute— 10—
valueof the elasticity of visits with respect to quality—adjusted price (.06).
Thisisconsistent with ourhypothesis thatconsumers should substitute visits
for quality as quality—adjusted price rises.
(3) An increase in the fixed costsofa visit simultaneously reduces
nber of visits andincreasequality per visit. In the demand curvefor
visits, the absolute value of the slope coefficientof fixed costs exceeds
thatofquality—adjusted price. This same result emergeswhen elasticities
at the mean are compared. Bothresultssupport ourpredictionthat fixed
costsshould be a re important determinant of visits than quality-adjusted
price.
II. Effects of Health on Labor Sutly and Wage Rates
Several persons have tested thehypothesesthat exogenous improvements
inhealthshould raise market produetivity, measured by the wage rate, and
hou1d also increase the amount of time allocated to work in themarket.0
Grossmanand Benham [14), for example, estimate the effects ofhealthon
laborsupply and wage rates in thecontextof fully specified structural
quationsfor these twocomponents of earnings. We also examine how the
estimated effects of health on labor market behavior are alteredwhenhealth
is made an endogenous variable. The npirical results confirm the two hypoth—
esesand suggest thattheeffect of health on productivityisstrengthened
when health is treated as an endogenous variable.
It is worth consideringthe role of health in thesupply side of labor
insome detail.My treatnent of health capital (12, 13]assumesthat an in-
crease in the stock of health increases the total amountofavailabletime
for work in the market and for household production during any specified time
interval, say a year. With the market wage rate and norunarket productivity
held constant, it would not be optimal for a consumer to allocate all of this— 1.1—
additionaltime to household production. If suchaplan were followed, then
the ratio of consumption time to market goods would rise, whichwould cause
the wage rate to exceed the value of the marginal product ofconsumption time.
Based on this argument, health should have a positive effecton the amount of
time supplied to the market.
Ifhealth is viewed as an exogenous variable,then its effect onlabor
Supply reflects a pure income effect. With the market wage rate and non—
market productivity held constant, an increase in health would raise ful]. in—
come, defined as earnings plus property (nonearrlings) income plus the mone-
tary value of time spent in consumption. Since healthier persons would have
more full income, their dnand for cosmodities and their derived demand for
marketgoods would expand. Inorder to purchase additional goods,theywould
spendmore time at work in the market. Although both property incoce and
healthinfluence hours of work by means of a pure income effect, these ef-
fects go in opposite directions. This difference arises becausean increase
inproperty income has noeffect on the amount of consumption time associated
witha given amount ofworking time. On the other hand, an increase in
healthhas no effect on the amount of consumption of market goods associated
with a given amount ofworking time.
I stress the aboveanalysisbecause of the well—known difficulties asso-
ciated with the use of property (noneazmings) income to estimatepure income
effects on laborsupplyin the cross section. The availability of health
measures in data sets such asthe Parnes sample, the Survey of Economic
Opportunity,and the IncomeDynamicsPanel mightallowone to refine existing
estimates of these effects. To be specific let Lbeannual leisuretime,t
be working time, s be sick time, w be total time, andw be the hourly wage
rate. As an identity— 12—
—t+t+s. (1)0
Supposethatthe demand curve forleisuretime is given by
t—a0+a1w+a28,
(2)
where the coefficient of s is negative and less thanonein absolute value.
Equations(1) and (2) imply a labor supplycurveof the form
t——a0—a1w—(a2+l) s . (3)
The hypothesis thatI am suggesting is that b Ea2 +1is significantly less
than one in a statistical sense.
Theabove frameworkis also relevant in isolating the pure effect of
norimarketproductivity variations on labor supply. This follows because in-
dexes of nomnarket productivity, such as years of formal schooling completed,
should be closely related to health. In a simple model suppose than an in-
dividual with no property income maximizes a utility function of the form
u(x, z) —u(x,a t), (4)
wherex is consumption of market goods, Lisleisure (normarket) time, and a
is a measure of nonxnarket productivity. Equation (4)i an elementaryversion
of the household production function model in which the home—produced cood—
ity (z) depends on time alone.
Associated with equation (4)is a demandcurve for leisure time of the
form (say)
lnt—b0+b1lnv+b2lna. (5)— 13—
Interms of basic parameters, one can show
-
b1—(l—k)(n—a) (6)
b2—k+ (1—k) a—i, (7)
wherekisthe share of leisure in full income, a istheelasticity of substi-
tution in constrnption between xandt,andn is the full income elasticity of




Therefore,b2.0as c1. That is,with the wage rate held constant, an
increasein noarket productivity would increase the demand for leisuretime
(would reduce the supply of hours of work) if theuncompensated price elas-
ticity of z exceeded one.
Atthe empirical level, nonmarket productivity canbemeasured by school-
ing.Thisframework can be expanded to estimate pure income effects withsick
time, With sick time heldconstant,other health variables could be added to
the supply function as proxies for nonmarket productivity.
III.Demandfor Children's Health and Medical Care
Inthe literature on theeconomics of fertility and optim family size,
a distinction ismadebetweenthe quantityand the quality of children. Stud-
ies by Friedman and Leibowitz [6], Goldman and Grosan[10], and Inman [15]
stressthatchildren's health is one aspect of their quality. Ina broadsense,
the aims of all three studies areto derive and estimate demand curvesfor— 14—
pediatriccare frc the interaction between the demand and production func—0
tiensof children's health. The study by Goldman and Grosan was described
in Section I. Friedman and Leibowitz (6] assume that mothers' schooling is
a positivecorrelate of efficiency in the production of healthy children.
In their model, parents transfer human(health) and non-humancapital to
their children. They postulate diminishing returns in the case of invest-
a
sentin humancapitalbut not in the case of investment in physical capital.
It follows that an increase in efficiency in health production would increase
the quantityofpediatric caredemanded.Empirically, they find thatmothers'
schoolinghas apositive andverysignificant effect on pediatric visits.
Irsnan(15) assumes that thechild health production function hasthree
directinputs: parents' time,preventive pediatric visits, and curative
pediatric visits.He postulates that the relative productivities of these
inputs should depend on mother's schooling. He finds some evidence in favor0
ofthis proposition in a sample of black children in Washington, D.C. The
membersof the sample were given a thoroughear,nose,andthroatexaxnina—
tion;and Inxnan uses the results of the examination asmeasuresofhealth.
Etaestimates of demand curves forthethree health care inputs reveal that
an increasein its relative productivity increases the quantity of the input
thatis demanded.
IngeneralIthink thatmuchmorework can be done on determinants of
children'shealth andmedicalcare utilization. Research in this area is
relatedto theoreticalandempirical studies of interactions between fertil-
ity and infant mortality by O'Hara (24], Lewit (17], and Williams (27].
IV. The SupplySide
Manypersons have pointed out that physicians play a rather unique role0
inthe marketfor medicalcare services. This has lead to theoretical— 15—
discussionsand empirical estirrates of the availability effect.By this is
meant the notionthat thephysician can directly influence the demandforhis
orher services. Intheir interstate modelof the market for physicians'
services, Fuchs andKramer(9] report that theelasticity ofphysicians' vis-
its per capita withrespect to physicians per capita is approximately egual
to .4.This estimate is obtained from a demand curve forvisits in.which in—
me andtheney price of a visit areheld constant. This finding is not
directevidence in favor of the availability effect. For example, the travel,
waiting,and inconvenience costs ofobtaining physicians' services should
fallas the number of physicians per capita rises. Yet many persons would
argue that theelasticity is too large to be explainedentirely by this fac-
tor.Moreover, in a study that controls for travel andwaiting time, May (19]
finds astatistically significant availability effect. His estimate, however,
isonly half as large as that ofFuchs and Kramer.
Pauly (25] hypothesizes that bettereducated consumers should be less
susceptibleto demand manipulationby physicians. Hetests this proposition
by estimating separatedemandcurves for physicians' visits for each of three
education groups. The individual is the unit of observation, but each demand
curve includes physicians per capitain thecounty of residence as an inde—
pendentvariable. Pauly reports thatthe size of the availability effect
f&flsas education rises.
The relatively high cost of thephysician input has stimulated analyses
ofthe market for paramedical personnel (health workers excludingphysicians).
Usingstatesof the United States as the units of observation, Monheit (20]
examines the effects of licensure on wage rates of registerednursesrelative
to wage rates of practical nurses and on number of RN'semployed relative to
ninber of PN's. Although all stateshadsome form of licensura by 1960,—-
flonheitdrawsadistinction between states inwhich licensure ismandato, and states jwhichit is perzn.issjve. Hisestimates are in the corite..,ctof a si—
ultaneous equations SUpply—demand odej.for the twotypesofpersonnel,On
thedeitand side, his mainresult is that mandatory
RN licensure raises the
relative wage of RN's. On thesupply side, his main result isthat mandatory
PN licensure lowers the relativenumber of PN', He also findsthat the elms—
ticity of substitution between RN's andPU's is greater thanone.
Fuchs [8] analyzes quality_adjusted
wage rates of health workers in1959
and in 1969 and trends betweenthese two years. Hereports a rapid increase
in wage rates in the 1960's,
particularly for RN's and PN's,Currently, he
isexamining thedeterm.inants of wage rates inhospitals as opposed toother
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